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23 June 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Meeting for Discussion on Further Development of Deterrence Paper

**PARTICIPANTS:** Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., DD/P; Mr. Walter Rostow, White House; General Edward G. Lansdale, DOD; Mr. Henry Ramsey, Dept. of State; Mr. Al Cox, DD/P

1. The officers named above met in the DD/P conference room at 1130 hours, 22 June 1961, to discuss further action on development of the paper on the subject of the U. S. Capabilities for Detering and Countering Communist Subversion and Guerrilla Operations in Underdeveloped Areas.

2. Mr. Bissell stated that he felt that there was need for papers in a number of different categories and that in several of these categories, there were already available existing papers which could be pulled together and edited to form a small reference library which could be of valuable assistance in formulating an overall paper. He listed these categories as follows:

a. Historical case studies. A number of such studies are already in existence.

b. Military doctrine. A number of papers, including Frank Lindsay's paper on guerrilla warfare, a recent Dept. of the Army paper on unconventional warfare, and the tactical doctrine for South Vietnam are available.

c. Present and threatening situations. A paper on this subject by OCI dated March 1961 is available.

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d. Communist doctrine. A recent paper by CI/ICD is available as well as works by Mao Tze Tung, Che Guevara, etc.

e. Organizational papers. Mr. Bissell noted that in specific cases such as South Vietnam and Laos today, there seems "to be reasonable agreement at high government levels as to responsibilities for action". He felt that there was a need for a sub-paper in this category on responsibilities for unattributed action and that there was some need for a discussion on this subject. He also stated that he felt there was a need for a broader sharing of knowledge in the Executive Branch, noting particularly as an example, the [REDACTED] activities and the problems involved.

f. Cuba. Mr. Bissell noted that he felt that one point that was missing in the Taylor report is a recognition that if a decision is made to use violence, which will probably involve some degree of attribution, there must be political risks and costs and a determination must be made as to just what kind of risks and costs are acceptable. He noted that Walter Lippman is addressing himself to this problem in recent articles. Mr. Lippman seems to argue that anything that we do must be truly covert, and if that is accepted, what then are the limits within which the U. S. can act? Mr. Rostow pointed out the extent of communist aggression in South Vietnam and queried as to whether do we simply try to cope with it defensively or do we, having established that aggression is taking place, attack Hanoi. General Lansdale remarked on the necessity for establishment of a legal base on which to operate and pointed out how the communists in Laos had recognized a government of their choice and then openly assisted that government.

3. Mr. Rostow then presented in outline form what he considered should be the format for the proposed paper. This was as follows:

**I**

1. A basic summary of the problem. (Mr. Bissell noted that this should be a brisk, short summary.)
2. Communist techniques.
3. The U. S. role and doctrine.
  - a. Overt
  - b. Covert
  - c. Legal basis - international law
  - d. The role of and attitudes in the UN

**II**

1. Types of situations. (Mr. Bissell felt that the approach used in the original outline paper, which establishes several types of situations, was a valuable one and should be made a part of this paper.)
2. Current and foreseeable situations.
  - a. Defensive
  - b. Aggressive (East Germany)

This section should contain a description of just what the U. S. Government is doing in each of the situations that are examined.

3. Description of the current U. S. organization and capability to handle the situations, with particular reference to the foreseeable problems in Africa, and the preparation or lack of preparation being made therefor.

### III Recommendations.

The recommendations should be specific and should be related to concrete cases discussed in the previous parts of the paper. Among items mentioned as properly deserving of specific recommendations are:

- a. The role of diplomatic action.
- b. Clarification of overt-covert actions and responsibilities.
- c. Specific note of areas in which our capabilities are in substantive arrears.
- d. The prompt identification of the establishment of a communist arms base in Africa and the immediate action to be taken thereon.
- e. The effectiveness of our operations in [REDACTED] where there seems to be a grave threat to the government.

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f. Specific recommendations with regard to the UN, with attention paid to the role of the neutral nations, to getting the communist aggression in South Vietnam into the UN, with the suggestion that effort be made to provide Ambassador Stevenson with documented and pictorial evidence as to the communications network operating from Hanoi to South Vietnam.

25X1C 4. Mr. Bissell noted that in every problem situation there was always present some element of indigenous revolt. We must develop a concept of what is aggression and then what can legally be done to counter that aggression. In this regard, he again mentioned [REDACTED] and then Cuba stating that we must surface Castro's expanding activities in WH by training, propaganda, arms deliveries, etc.

5. General Lansdale stated that he felt that it must be recognized that there are two kinds of evidence - legal evidence that can be produced

and will stand up in court, and propaganda evidence such as that used by the Commies in Indonesia which is used to create public opinion rather than to gain a legal decision.

6. In answer to a question on organization, Mr. Rostow stated that the recommendations on organization should be based on concrete cases rather than on abstract reasoning.

7. Mr. Ramsey queried as to the purpose of the paper. Mr. Rostow replied that it was to provide a more profound awareness, probably through the NSC mechanism to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the DCI of the problems, and to make recommendations for specific regional and country actions, for better structural organization of the UN, and as an example, to highlight to the Department of State the need for various actions with regard to the UN.

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9. Mr. Rostow re-emphasized the importance of the paper providing, in effect, an order of battle which arrayed our capabilities against our problems.

10. General Lansdale stated that because of some of his problems in the Pentagon, he hoped that a draft of the paper could be provided to circulate through the DOD and that he hoped that the knowledge of continuing development of the paper in the next few weeks could be as limited as possible so that he would not be constantly called on by his associates who might like to participate in the early drafting. It was agreed to set a July 20 deadline for producing a draft to be circulated, and that until such a draft was prepared, the size of the group was to remain as constituted at the meeting. Mr. Bissell further undertook to produce a draft by 8 or 10 July for circulation just among the participating members.

11. Mr. Bissell queried Mr. Ramsey as to a paper which he had briefly been shown which had been produced in State and concerns itself with a juridical and moral basis for actions. Mr. Ramsey briefly outlined the purpose of the paper indicating that it did not have formal approval within the Department of State, but agreed to furnish Mr. Bissell with a copy of the paper.

12. Mr. Rostow stated that, in essence, he thought the paper should state how we propose to do things in terms of doctrine, in terms of specific cases, and in terms of organization. He felt that the paper would always be subject to nit-picking, and never be fully accepted, but that it should lead to a number of specific and helpful actions.

13. Mr. Rostow and General Lansdale then had a brief discussion with regard to President Diem's letter to the President requesting a force increase of 100,000. I will not report on this conversation in this memorandum. Mr. Bissell closed the meeting by saying that there were two specific matters which he felt would require decision and action in the very near future. The first was the continuing support of the 9 - 10 thousand MEO's that we have armed in Laos, and the second was reports that had reached him and caused him concern, to the effect that Ambassador Young's proposed programs for Thailand had been running into difficulty in State, apparently largely because of economic reasons.

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Signed

Chief,   
Covert Action Staff